2.7 Taqdir Or Predestination

A great deal of misunderstanding prevails about the doctrine of predestination and the absolute decree of good and evil by God. It is necessary first to understand the correct meaning of the Arabic words qadar and taqdir — the ideas commonly associated with their meaning being unknown both to the Holy Qur’an and to Arabic lexicology. Qadar and taqdir, according to Raghib, mean the making manifest of the measure (kamiyya) of a thing, or simply measure. In the words of the same authority, God’s taqdir of things is in two ways, by granting qudra, i.e., power or by making them in a particular measure and in a particular manner, as wisdom requires. An example of this is given in the taqdir of the date-stone, out of which it is the palm only that grows, not an apple or olive tree, or in the taqdir of the sperm of man, out of which grows man only, not any other animal. Taqdir is therefore the law or the ordinance or the measure which is working throughout the creation; and this is exactly the sense in which the word is used in the Holy Qur’an. For example, it speaks of a taqdir for each and everything that has been created: “Glorify the name of thy Lord, the Most High, Who creates, then makes complete, and Who measures (qaddara from taqdir), then guides” (87:1-3). “Who created everything, then ordained for it a measure (taqdir) (25:2). “Surely We have created everything according to a measure (qadar)” (54:49). “And the sun moves on to its destination. That is the ordinance (taqdir) of the Mighty, the Knowing. And the moon, We have ordained (qaddarna from taqdir) for it stages” (36:38, 39).

The law according to which foods, provisions and other things are provided in the earth is also called a taqdir of God, and so, also, the law according to which rain falls on the earth, and that according to which night and day follow each other: “And He made in it mountains above its surface, and He blessed therein and ordained (qaddara) therein its foods” (41:10). “And there is not a thing but with Us are the treasures of it, and We send it not down but in a known measure (qadar)” (15:21). “And We send down water from the cloud according to a measure (qadar)” (23:18; 43:11). “And Allah measures (yuqaddiru from taqdir) the night and the day” (73:20).

Though man is included in the creation, and his taqdir is therefore the same as that of the whole creation, he is also separately spoken of as having a taqdir similar to the law of growth and development in other things: “Of what thing did He create him? Of a small life-germ. He creates him, then proportions him (qaddara-hu)” (80:18, 19).

All these verses go to show that, as according to lexicologists, taqdir, in the language of the Holy Qur’an, is the universal law of God, operating as much in the case of man as in the rest of nature: a law extending to the sun, the moon, the stars, the earth and the heavens and all that exists in them. This universal law is fully explained in two short verses already quoted: “Who creates, then makes complete, and Who measures, then guides”. Four things are mentioned regarding every object of creation, including man: its creation (khalq), its completion (taswiya), its measure (taqdir), and its guidance to its goal (hidaya). The law of life, as witnessed in nature, is exactly the law described here. Everything is created so as finally to attain to its completion, this completion being brought about according to a law or a measure within which everything works by Divine guidance. Thus the taqdir of a thing is the law or the measure of its growth and development and the taqdir of man is not different in nature from the taqdir of other things.

Taqdir, meaning the absolute decree of good and evil by God, an idea with which the word is now indissolubly connected by the popular mind as well as by thinking writers, is neither known to the Holy Qur’an, nor even to Arabic lexicology. The doctrine of predestination is of later growth, and seems to have been the result of the clash of Islam with Persian religious thought. The doctrine that there are two creators, a creator of good and a creator of evil, had become the central doctrine of the Magian religion, just as the Trinity had become that of the Christian faith. The religion of Islam taught the purest monotheism, and it was probably in controverting the dualistic doctrine of the Magian religion, that the discussion arose as to whether or not God was the Creator of evil and many side-issues sprang up. All this was due only to a misunderstanding of the nature of good and evil. God created man with certain powers which he could exercise under certain limitations, and it is the exercise of these powers in one way or another that produces good or evil. For instance, God has gifted man with the power of speech, which he can use either to do good or evil to humanity, either to tell a truth and say a good word, or to utter falsehood and slander. Similarly, man has been endowed with numerous other powers which may be used either for good or for evil. Hence the controversy, as to whether God was the Creator of good and evil, arose simply out of a misconception of the nature of good and evil. The same act may be a virtue on one occasion and evil on another. A blow struck in self-defence or in defence of a helpless man is right, and a blow struck aggressively is wrong. Hence evil is also called zulm, which, according to lexicologists, means the placing of a thing in a place other than that which is meant for it, either by falling short or by excess or by deviation from its time or its place (R.). Thus the use of a power in the right manner, or at the right moment, or in the right place is a virtue, and its use in a wrong manner or at a wrong moment, or at the wrong place is a vice. The Holy Qur’an, therefore, has not dealt with the question of the creation of good and evil at all. It speaks of the creation of heavens and earth and all that is in them; it speaks of the creation of man; it speaks of endowing him with certain faculties and granting him certain powers; it tells us that he can use these powers and faculties within certain limitations, just as all other created things are placed within certain limitations — and the limitations of each kind are its taqdir. But in the Holy Qur’an, there is no mention of a taqdir to mean either the creation of good and evil deeds, or an absolute decree of good and evil by God.

The following verse is sometimes quoted as showing that God is the Creator of the actions of man: “And Allah has created you and what you make” (37:96). The Arabic word for “you make” is ta‘malun, from ‘aml which means both doing and making. So the words are sometimes taken as meaning “what you do” instead of “what you make,” and from this it is concluded that God is the Creator of the actions of man, and as these actions are good as well as bad, therefore God is the Creator of the evil deeds of man. The context, however, shows that ma ta‘malun here means “what you make,” and not “what you do,” and the verse in question does not speak of the good and evil deeds of man, but of the idols and stones which were worshipped. The preceding verses 91-93 speak of Abraham’s breaking the idols; v. 94 says that when the people saw their idols broken, they advanced towards him; vv. 95, 96 contain Abraham’s arguments against idol-worship: “Do you worship that which you hew out? And Allah has created you and what you make.” Now the concluding words “what you make” clearly refer to the idols which they made, and the argument is clear that what was hewed out by man’s own hands could not be God, God being the Creator of man as well as of the stones which were made into idols. This interpretation has been accepted by the best commentators.

It may, however, be added that God is recognized by the Holy Qur’an as the first and ultimate cause of all things; but this does not mean that He is the Creator of the deeds of man. He has, of course, created man; He has also created the circumstances under which he lives and acts; but still He has endowed man with a discretion to choose how to act, which he can exercise under certain limitations, just as all his other powers and faculties are exercised under limitations and only in accordance with certain laws. Thus it is said in the Holy Qur’an: “The truth is from your Lord; so let him who please believe and let him who please disbelieve” (18:29). And as he can exercise his discretion or his will in doing a thing or not doing it, he is responsible for his own deeds and is made to suffer the consequences.

A great deal of misunderstanding exists as to the relation of the Divine will to the will of man. All the faculties with which man has been endowed have emanated from the great Divine attributes. Yet all human attributes are imperfect, and can be exercised only under certain limitations and to a certain extent. God is All-Seeing and All-Hearing; man also sees and hears, but these attributes in him bear no comparison to the Divine attributes of seeing and hearing, being only imperfect and miniature images of the perfect and infinite attributes of the Divine Being, even as the reflecting mirror of human nature is itself imperfect and finite. For the very same reason, man’s exercise of these attributes is also subject to certain limitations and laws. Man’s knowledge of things, his exercise of power over things and his exercise of his will in relation to things stand on a par. All these are subject to limitations and laws. Man’s will stands in the same relation to the Divine will as his other attributes to the attributes of the Divine Being. He can exercise it under limitations and laws, and there is a very large variety of circumstances which may determine his choice in each case. Yet it is not true that the choice to exercise it has been taken away from him; and the fact is that, notwithstanding all the limitations, he is free to exercise his will, and, therefore, though he may not be responsible to the same extent for everything and in all cases — and a variety of circumstances must determine the extent of his responsibility, which may be very small, almost negligible, in some cases, and very great in others — yet he is a free agent and responsible for what he does.

The Qur’anic verses bearing on this subject may be considered. The argument that man does an evil deed because God wills it so, is put into the mouth of the opponents of the Holy Prophet on several occasions. For instance: “The polytheists say: If Allah had pleased, we would not have set up aught with Him, nor our fathers, nor would we have made anything unlawful. Thus did those before them reject (the truth) until they tasted our punishment. Say, Have you any knowledge so you would bring it forth to Us? You only follow a conjecture and you only tell lies. Say, Then Allah’s is the conclusive argument; so if He had pleased, He would have guided you all” (6:148, 149). The polytheists’ contention here is that what they do is in accordance with the will of God, and this is condemned as a mere conjecture and a lie. And against it, two arguments are adduced. The first is that previous people were punished when they persisted in their evil courses; if what they did was because God had so willed it, He would not have punished them for it. The second is that God had never said so through any of His prophets: “Have you any knowledge with you so you should bring it forth to Us?” And in the verse that follows, the argument is carried further: “If He had willed, He would have guided you all.” The conclusion is clear. If it were the Divine will that people should be compelled to one course that would have been the course of guidance. But men are not compelled to accept even the right way: much less could they be compelled to follow the wrong course. This is clearly laid down: “We have truly shown him the way, he may be thankful or unthankful” (76:3). And again: “The truth is from your Lord, so let him who please believe, and let him who please disbelieve” (18:29). The Divine will is therefore exercised in the raising up of prophets, and in the pointing out of the courses of good and evil, and human will is exercised in the choice of one course or the other.

It is this very law that is expressed at the end of ch. 76: “Surely this is a Reminder, so whoever will, let him take a way to his Lord. And you will not, unless Allah please” (76:29, 30). And again to the same effect: “It is naught but a Reminder for the nations, for him among you who will go straight. And you will not, except Allah please, the Lord of the worlds” (81:27-29). In both these places, the Holy Qur’an is spoken of as having been revealed for the upliftment of man, yet, it is added, only he will derive benefit from it who chooses to go straight or takes a way to his Lord, that is, exercises his will in the right direction. Thus man is left to make his choice after God has sent down a revelation, and the will of man to make a choice is thus exercised only after the will of God has been exercised in the sending down of a revelation. If God had not pleased to reveal the reminder, man would have had no choice. Thus the words “you will not, unless Allah please,” mean only this that if God had not pleased to send a revelation, man would not have been able to make his choice of good or evil.

The doctrine of predestination, or the decreeing of a good course for one man and an evil course for another, thus finds no support from the Holy Qur’an which gives to man the choice to follow one way or the other. But, it is said, the doctrine of the decreeing of good and evil follows from the doctrine of the foreknowledge of God. If God knows what will happen in the future, whether a particular man will take a good or an evil course, it follows that that man must take that particular course, for the knowledge of God cannot be untrue. Now in the first place, it must be clearly understood what God’s knowledge of the future means. The fact is that the future is an open book to God. The limitations of time and space, which are everything to man, are nothing to God. Man’s knowledge of things is limited by both time and space but to the Infinite Being, unlimited space is as it were a single point and the past and the future are like the present. God sees or knows the future as a man would know what is passing before his eyes. God’s knowledge of the future therefore, though far above and far superior to man’s knowledge, is like his knowledge of the present, and mere knowledge of a thing does not interfere with the choice of the agent or the doer. Hence God’s foreknowledge has nothing to do with predestination.

Statements are frequently met with in the Holy Qur’an in which God is spoken of as having written down the doom of a nation, or a man’s term of life, or an affliction. Such verses have also been misconstrued as upholding the doctrine of predestination. The misconception is due to a wrong interpretation of the word kitab, which ordinarily carries the significance of writing, but has been freely used in Arabic literature and in the Holy Qur’an itself in a variety of senses. Examples of these uses are: “Allah has written down (kataba), I shall certainly prevail, I and My messengers” (58:21). “Nothing will afflict us save that which Allah has ordained (kataba) for us” (9:51). “Say: Had you remained in your houses, those for whom slaughter was ordained (kutiba) would have gone forth to the places where they would be slain (3:154). In all these instances there is no mention of predestination or the fixing beforehand of an evil course for the evil-doer. In the first example the meaning is clearly this, that the order or command has gone forth from God, that the Holy Prophet will triumph, and God’s orders must come to pass. “God has written down” only means that it is God’s order that such a thing should happen. It is not necessary to seek a reference to any previous writing or previous order, because the order or writing is there in these words themselves, but, if necessary, the reference may be to the numerous prophecies that are met with in the Holy Qur’an regarding the ultimate triumph of the Holy Prophet, and which were in fact written down in a literal sense.

In the other two examples, there is mention of distress or death having been ordained or written down. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that even if by the writing down of death or distress it is meant that such was preordained for them, it does not lend any support to the doctrine of predestination, which means that the evil course of an evil-doer has been fixed for him beforehand, and that no choice is left to him to adopt either a good or an evil course. Death or distress is due to circumstances over which man has no control, while the doing of good or evil is a matter entirely of man’s own choice, according to the Holy Qur’an. But, as a matter of fact, there is no mention of preordaining here, for kitaba is used in the sense of ordering or ordaining and not preordaining. The following two verses may be compared: “No disaster befalls in the earth, or in yourselves, but it is in a book before We bring it into existence” (57:22); “No calamity befalls but by Allah’s permission (idhn)” (64:11). The word idhn used here means, according to Raghib, knowledge of a thing, where there is with it also mashia i.e., permission or order. It is clear, from a comparison of these two verses, that what is called kitaba in one place is called idhn in another. Thus the writing of Allah is only His knowledge or permission or order.

The Holy Book throws further light on this subject where it makes mention of the Divine intention to bring the faithful to perfection through adversities. Thus, speaking of the believers in particular, it says: “And We shall certainly try you with something of fear and hunger and loss of property and lives and fruits. And give good news to the patient, who, when a misfortune befalls them, say: ‘Surely we are Allah’s and to Him we shall return’. Those are they on whom are blessings and mercy from their Lord and those are the followers of the right course” (2:155-157). The principle is laid down here that the faithful are brought to perfection through adversities and trials, because we are told that Allah intends to try the believers by means of various kinds of affliction, and through patience in suffering, they make themselves deserving of Divine blessings and mercy. Therefore when the faithful are made to say, “Nothing will afflict us save that which Allah has ordained for us” (9:51), it is in reference to the Divine will, as expressed above, and they are made to suffer afflictions for their own perfection. God’s writing down afflictions for them means, therefore, only that the Divine law is that they will be brought to perfection through afflictions. Of like significance is 3:154.

Both the verses quoted above and other similar verses, which speak of the writing down of afflictions for the believers, only teach that greatest lesson of life, resignation in adversities. Muslims are taught to remain absolutely contented when they have to meet adversity or death in fulfilment of their duties. If a Muslim meets adversity or even death, he must believe that it is by God’s order, that being the real meaning of kitabat in such cases. That faith upholds a Muslim in adversity because he knows that, out of an adversity which is by the order of the good God, will undoubtedly come good. There is a message in these verses that Muslims must face all adversities manfully and never despair of the mercy of God.

A few words may be added in this connection on the lauh mahfuz, which is generally supposed to contain all the decrees of God in writing. The word lauh means a plank, and also a tablet for writing, and mahfuz, means that which is guarded. The expression lauh mahfuz occurs but once in the Holy Qur’an, and there it is mentioned in connection with the guarding of the Holy Qur’an itself: “Nay, it is a glorious Qur’an, in a guarded tablet” (85:21, 22). The word lauh in its plural form alwah is used in connection with the books of Moses: “And We ordained for him in the tablets (alwah) admonition of every kind and clear explanation of all things” (7:145). The alwah of Moses and the lauh of the Holy Qur’an are the same; only in the case of the Holy Qur’an the lauh is stated to be guarded or mahfuz, for which the explanation is given “that the Holy Qur’an is protected against change and alteration” (R.). The meaning conveyed is therefore exactly the same as is elsewhere stated about the Holy Qur’an: “Surely We have revealed the Reminder, and surely We are its guardian” (15:9). The significance in both cases is that no alteration shall find a way into the text of the Holy Qur’an, and that it shall be preserved in full purity. So far as the Holy Qur’an is concerned, there is no mention in it of a lauh mahfuz in which the decrees of God are written. God’s writing is not of the same nature as man’s writing; for man stands in need of pen, ink and writing material. This has elsewhere been explained in connection with the Divine attributes, where it has been shown that though speaking, seeing, hearing and other deeds are ascribed to God, yet the nature of these deeds is quite different from that of man’s deeds, for God does not stand in need of means for the doing of an act, while man does. The writing of God therefore does not stand in need of a tablet or ink or pen, and if a guarded tablet (lauh mahfuz) is spoken of in certain hadith, it stands only for the great and all-comprehensive knowledge of God, before which everything is as clear as written words on a tablet are before man.

A great misconception regarding the teachings of the Holy Qur’an is that it ascribes to God the attribute of leading astray. Nothing could be farther from the truth. While al-Hadi, or the One Who guides, is one of the ninety-nine names of Allah, as accepted by all Muslims, al-Mudzill, or the One Who leads astray, has never been recognized as such. If leading astray were an attribute of God, as guiding certainly is, the name al-Mudzill should have been included in the list of His names, as al-Hadi is. But the Holy Qur’an, which repeatedly says that God’s are all the excellent names, could not ascribe to Him what it has plainly ascribed to the Devil, viz., the leading astray of men. This act is conclusive so far as the leading astray of men is concerned, but there are several other considerations which confirm it. The sinners’ own confession, as repeatedly mentioned in the Holy Qur’an, is that their great leaders misled them, or that the Devil misled them. Not once do they put forward the excuse that it was God Himself Who misled them: “Until when they all follow one another into it (the fire), the last of them will say with regard to the first of them: Our Lord! these led us astray, so give them a double chastisement of the Fire” (7:38). “O woe is me! Would that I had not taken such a one for a friend! Certainly he led me astray from the Reminder after it had come to me (25:28, 29). “And none but the guilty led us astray” (26:99). “And they say: Our Lord, we only obeyed our leaders and our great men, so they led us astray from the path. Our Lord! Give them a double chastisement and curse them with a great curse” (33:67, 68). “And those who disbelieve will say: Our Lord, show us those who led us astray from among the jinn and the men that we may trample them under our feet, so that they may be of the lowest” (41:29).

If God had really led men astray, their best excuse on the Day of Judgement would have been that they did not deserve to be punished, because it was God Himself Who led them astray. But not once is that excuse advanced, and it is always the guilty leaders, both from among men and jinn, who are denounced by the followers as having misled them. This is another conclusive argument that it is not God Who leads men astray.

In the third place, the Holy Qur’an is full of statements to the effect that God sends His prophets and grants revelation for the guidance of the people. The general rule laid down with regard to Divine dealing with humanity is thus made clear in the very beginning. “Surely there will come to you a guidance from Me, then whoever follows My guidance, no fear shall come upon them, nor shall they grieve” (2:38). It is impossible that God, Who is so solicitous for the guidance of man, should Himself lead him astray. Guiding and leading astray are two contradictions which could not be gathered together in one being. The Holy Qur’an itself draws attention to this point: “And it is not attributable to Allah that He should lead a people astray after He has guided them, so far so that He makes clear to them what they should guard against” (9:115). The argument is evident. The Being Who sends guidance to a people could not lead them astray; how, then, could it be ascribed to God that He makes men fall into evil when He sends His messengers to explain to people that they should guard against evil?

The mistaken idea that God leads people astray arises out of a misconception of the meaning of the word idzlal when it is ascribed to God. The word idzlal carries a variety of meanings besides leading astray. It should be noted that wherever idzlal is attributed to God, it is only in connection with the transgressors, the unjust, and the extravagant, never for people generally. Idzlal is the causative form of dzlal, which means swerving from the straight path, and the word is applied to every swerving from the right path whether it is intentional or unintentional, and whether it is very small or very great; … wherefore it may be used of him who commits any mistake whatsoever (R.). According to the same authority, idzlal is of two kinds. The first kind is that in which dzlal (or going astray) is the cause of idzlal. This again may be in two ways: (1) when a thing has itself gone astray from you, as you say, adzlaltu-l-ba’ira, the meaning of which is, I lost the camel not I led the camel astray, which is not true in this case; and (2) when you judge a person to be in error or going astray; and in both these cases going astray on the part of the object of idzlal is the cause of idzlal or leading astray. The second kind is that in which idzlal or leading astray is the cause of the going astray of the object of idzlal and it is in this way that you embellish evil to a man so that he may fall into it (R.). The word, as used in the Holy Qur’an with reference to God means judging or finding one to be in error. This was a recognized use of the word among the Arabs. Thus in a verse of Tarfah, the words adzallani sadiqi mean my friend judged me to be in error (LA.). And in a hadith it is said that the Holy Prophet came to a people fa-adzalla-hum, i.e., he found them adopting a wrong course, not following the true path (N). Ibn Athir gives further examples showing that adzalla-hu means he found him in error just as ahmadtu-hu means I found him in a praiseworthy condition, and abkhaltu-hu means I found him a niggard (N.). In fact, this sense of the word is recognized by all lexicologists. Explaining adzalla-hu, Lane says: “And he found him to be erring, straying … like as one says ahmada-hu and abkhala-hu” (LL.), and this explanation is quoted from the Taj al-‘Arus.

Hence, since idzlal cannot be applied to God in the sense of leading astray, and since it is always the transgressors and the extravagant whose idzlal by God is spoken of, the only significance that can be attached to that word, in this case, is God’s judging them to be in error or finding them in error, or in some cases, God’s bringing them to destruction which is also an approved significance.

Another misconception which must be removed in this connection is that relating to God setting seals on hearts. The misconception in this case is that it is thought that God has created some men with seals on their hearts, while others have been created with free and open hearts. No trace of any such distinction is met with anywhere either in the Holy Qur’an or in Hadith. All men are created sinless, all men are created pure, that is the express teaching of Islam. The Holy Qur’an says: “So set thy face for religion being upright, the nature (fitrah) made by Allah in which He has created men. There is no altering Allah’s creation. That is the right religion” (30:30). According to this verse all men have been created in pure nature, and a hadith of the Holy Prophet, which is really an explanation of this verse, says: “Every child that is born conforms to fitrah (human nature), and it is his parents who make him a Jew or a Christian or a Magian” (Bu. 23:80). The idea that some men are born with a seal on their hearts is directly opposed to this teaching. The Holy Qur’an does speak of God setting seals on some hearts, but it says expressly that seals are set on the hearts of the reprobate, the hardened sinners who pay no heed to the call of the Holy Prophet. In the very beginning of the Holy Qur’an, it is stated: “Those who disbelieve — it being alike to them whether thou warn them or warn them not — they will not believe. Allah has sealed their hearts and their hearing; and there is a covering over their eyes” (2:6, 7). It should be noted that though sealing is spoken of here, yet it is in connection with those who have so hardened their hearts that they do not pay any heed to the Holy Prophet’s warning. They refuse to open their hearts to receive the truth, and do not lend their ears to listen to it, nor use their eyes to discern the truth from falsehood. As is elsewhere stated: “They have hearts wherewith they understand not, and they have eyes wherewith they see not, and they have ears wherewith they hear not. They are as cattle” (7:179). And again, they are made to say: “Our hearts are under coverings from that to which thou callest us, and there is a deafness in our ears, and there is a veil between us and thee” (41:5). It is always the reprobate whose heart is said to be sealed. “Thus does Allah seal every heart of a proud, haughty one” (40:35). The fact that the cause of the seal is the sinner’s own act of not heeding the warning, is made clear on another occasion also: “And there are those of them who seek to listen to thee, till, when they go forth from thee, they say to those who have been given knowledge: What was it that he said just now? These are they whose hearts Allah has sealed and they follow their low desires” (47:16).

All these verses show that God sets a seal upon the hearts of certain people as a result of their own actions. They do not listen to the Holy Prophet’s call, they give no heed to his warning, they do not try to understand what he says, and the result is that God seals their hearts. If a person closes upon himself the doors of his house, he will naturally be in darkness. Just in the same manner, those who themselves close the doors of their hearts are visited with the natural consequence of this, the setting of a seal. The seal, therefore, being the consequence of a man’s own deeds, has nothing to do with the doctrine of predestination.

Some of the hadith from which predestination is concluded may now be considered, but it has to be borne in mind clearly that Hadith must be read subject to the broad principles established in the Holy Qur’an, and must be so interpreted as not to clash with the Book of God, and that in case of a clash it is the Hadith that must be rejected; for its words are often the words of narrators, and in such metaphysical subjects there has been a good deal of mixing up of the ideas of the narrators through a long chain of transmitters. There is a great deal of difference between Hadith relating to the rules and regulations of daily life, which every man could easily understand and retain in memory, and those relating to metaphysical subjects where the ideas of the transmitters would, sometimes quite unintentionally, and sometimes on account of not clearly understanding the real concept of the words, affect the narration of the report, and where the change of a single word may sometimes change the underlying idea entirely.

Bearing this in mind we may consider the reports narrated in the Book of Qadar in Bukhari, but first a hadith may be considered which, though not accredited by the best authorities, is the stock argument of Western writers regarding predestination in Islam. This hadith occurs in several different forms in Abu Dawud, Tirmidhi and Ahmad, and the gist of it is that when God created Adam, He also brought forth the souls of his children. The particular form of this hadith, which appeals to the Western writers, is that occurring in one report of Ahmad: “He said to the souls on His right hand, To Paradise and I do not care; and He said to those on His left hand, To the fire and I do not care” (MM. 1:4—iii). This hadith discloses such a distorted picture of Divine dealing with man that there should not be the least hesitation in rejecting it. The Holy Qur’an says in plain words that it is for mercy that He created all men; it speaks of the Divine mercy as encompassing all things, like His knowledge; it tells the most obdurate sinner not to despair of His mercy, for “Allah forgives the sins altogether”; it describes God again and again as the most Merciful of all merciful ones. Hadith draws a similar picture of the indescribable mercy of God. It tells us that God wrote down, when He ordered creation, that “His mercy shall take precedence of His displeasure”; it describes God as having divided His mercy into a hundred parts and as having sent into the world only one part, the whole of love finding expression in the created beings, including the love of a mother for her offspring, being a manifestation of that hundredth part, and the other ninety-nine parts finding their expression on the Day of Resurrection, so that if the unbeliever knew of the whole of Divine mercy, he would not despair of going to Paradise; it draws a picture of the unbounded mercy of God when it speaks of how the Holy Prophet, on seeing a mother pressing her child to her bosom, remarked to his Companions: “Do you think that she can throw this child into the fire?” And on their replying in the negative, added: “Allah is much more merciful to His creatures than this woman to her child.” Could God with all this mercy, which is beyond human conception, be in the same breath described as saying: “These to fire and I do not care?” Certainly these cannot be the words of the Holy Prophet. It is the error of some narrator in the long chain of the transmission of the report.

In another form the same hadith occurs as an explanation of a verse of the Holy Qur’an, and runs as follows: “Allah created Adam and then He touched his back with His right hand and brought forth from it children, and said, ‘These I have created for Paradise and they will do the works of the inmates of Paradise;’ again He touched his back and brought forth children and said, ‘These I have created for the fire and they will do the works of the inmates of the fire’ (MM.1:4—ii). This does not mean that, in creating men, God had decreed one portion for Paradise and another for the fire. It denotes only the all-comprehending knowledge of God. However, if we read the verse of which this hadith is said to be an explanation, we shall find that the two have nothing in common except the idea of bringing forth offspring. The verse in question is: “And when thy Lord brought forth from the children of Adam, from their loins, their descendants, and made them bear witness about themselves: Am I not your Lord? They said: Yes; we bear witness” (7:172). It will be seen that the hadith contains no explanation of the verse at all, which speaks of something quite different.

The real explanation of the verse occurs in another hadith, and undoubtedly there was some misunderstanding on the part of some narrator, which misled him into giving an explanation having nothing in common with the original and, indeed, quite opposed to the Qur’anic text of which it is alleged to be an explanation. Quoting the verse, Ubayy ibn Ka‘b explains it thus: “He gathered them and made them pairs, gave them forms and made them speak so that they talked. Then He took a promise and agreement from them and made them bear witness about themselves, saying, Am I not your Lord? They said, Yes. He said, I call to witness against you the seven heavens and the seven earths, and I call to witness against you your father Adam, lest you say on the Day of Resurrection, ‘We did not know this.’ Know that there is no God but I, and there is no Lord but I, and do not associate anything with Me; I will surely send to you My messengers who will remind you of this My promise and this My covenant, and I will reveal to you My books. They said, ‘We bear witness that Thou art our Lord and our God; we have no Lord besides Thee and we have no God besides Thee’ (MM. 1:4—iii).

If we take the verse itself, we find it so clear that not only does it need no explanation but it even removes the obscurity of the so-called explanations; for it speaks plainly of the bringing forth of the children, not from the loins of Adam but from the loins of the “children of Adam”. The verse, therefore, clearly refers to every human being as he comes into existence, and the evidence referred to is that which is afforded by human nature itself, that God is its Creator. This is said elsewhere too: “So set thy face for religion being upright, the nature made by Allah in which He has created men. There is no altering Allah’s creation. That is the right religion, but most people do not know” (30:30). Both these verses announce in clear words that every human child is born into the world in a pure state; none comes into life with the impress of hell on it. Human nature is so made that it is not compelled to follow the evil course. It is free from every taint. Even Hadith states that “every child is born in the fitrah” (the right state or the condition of Islam), and that it is his parents who later on “make him a Jew or a Christian or a Magian” (Bu. 23:80, 93). Thus both the Holy Qur’an and the Hadith cut at the root of the doctrine of predestination.

It is quite in consonance with this principle that Islam recognizes that all children, whether born of believing or unbelieving parents, go to Paradise if they die before attaining the age of discretion. Even if this had not been expressly stated, it would have been a foregone conclusion of the principle laid down above on the basis of the Holy Qur’an and the Hadith that every child is born with a pure nature, a Muslim. But there is a clear hadith to that effect. It is related that the Holy Prophet saw in a vision an old man at the foot of a large tree and around him were children, and in the vision he was told that the old man was Abraham and the children that were around him were the children who died before attaining the age of discretion (‘ala-l-fitrah). “At this some of the Muslims asked him: And the children of polytheists, too, O Messenger of Allah!” The Holy Prophet replied: “The children of polytheists as well” (Bu. 92:48). Being with Abraham clearly meant being in Paradise. According to another report, when the Holy Prophet was questioned about the children of the polytheists, he is reported to have said: “When Allah created them, He knew what they would do” (Bu. 23:93). These words have been variously interpreted, but it would be wrong to give them a significance contradicting the plain words of the first report. At any rate, it does not mean that God knew what they would do after attaining majority, since they were to die before that. It, therefore, means that God knew that they would die in the condition in which they were born, i.e., the condition of Islam, because He knew that they would not attain to the age of discretion, when they would be able to judge between right and wrong and adopt the one course or the other.

It would be difficult to consider here all the hadith relating to qadar. Only Bukhari, the most reliable collection of Hadith, may be considered. In the first place, Bukhari does not relate a single report speaking of faith in qadar, and thus the question that such a faith is one of the fundamentals of Islam is disposed of, for faith in qadar is unknown both to the Holy Qur’an and to the most reliable collection of Hadith. Coming to the actual hadith which Bukhari has related in his Jami‘ in book 82, called Qadar, one finds that not a single report in this chapter lends any support to the theory that a good or an evil course has been chalked out beforehand and is forced upon man. The hadith related here, as well as in other collections, generally speak either of the Divine knowledge of things or the Divine command prevailing over all. The most well-known report from which predestination is concluded is that speaking of an angel being in charge of the embryo — “an angel is sent to the embryo, and he is commanded with four things; his sustenance and his term of life and whether he is unhappy or happy (Bu. 82:1). The same hadith occurring elsewhere is in the following words: “Then an angel is sent and he is commanded with the four words. It is said to him, Write down his actions and his sustenance and his term of life and whether he is unhappy or happy” (Bu. 59:6). The writing down of actions in the state of embryo seems to be a case of a clear mistake; for the Holy Qur’an plainly speaks of angels writing down the deeds when they are done, and in this connection not one, but two angels are spoken of. But even if the words are accepted as correct they can be interpreted in consonance with the teachings of the Holy Qur’an to mean that the Divine knowledge of things is all-comprehensive, so much so that He knows all about a man even in the embryonic state. The angel’s record, as already shown does not mean actually writing down in a book; it is only expressive of Divine knowledge. As the properties of the seed are all in the seed, so even the embryo shows what the man will develop into. No human eye can see these hidden potentialities; but nothing is hidden from God.

Another hadith bearing on the subject is that which speaks of Adam’s argument with Moses. Moses is reported to have said to Adam that it was his own fault that caused him to get out of the garden, to which Adam replied: “Dost thou blame me for a matter which had been ordained for me before I was created” (Bu. 60:31). It is added in the report that Adam prevailed over Moses in argument. A reference to the Holy Qur’an will show that Adam’s fault was not really the cause of his children living in a particular state, for it is after forgiveness of Adam’s fault that mankind are told to live in that particular state, the state of hubut as it is called, which is the state of struggle with the devil. It is not actually a fall, though there is in it the liability to fall, but there is also along with it the chance to conquer, and to subjugate the devil and thus rise to perfection. Man could be placed in one of the two conditions. He could be made to live either in a state in which there would be no struggle, but then there would be also no chance to conquer, no hope of rising to great spiritual heights; or he could be placed in a state of struggle in which there is the liability to fall and the chance to conquer and rise to greatness. This latter condition is called the state of hubut in the Holy Qur’an. Adam was no doubt placed in a garden and he could be spoken of as going forth from it, but his posterity was never placed in that garden and therefore they could not be spoken of as going forth from it. No one can be spoken of as going forth from a condition or a place in which he has never been. Therefore the hubut is quite different from getting out of the garden, and it is after forgiveness even of Adam’s fault that the hubut of mankind is spoken of. Thus 2:36 speaks of Adam’s fault, 2:37 speaks of the fault being forgiven, and 2:38 speaks of the hubut of Adam’s children, the last two verses being: “Then Adam received (revealed) words from his Lord, and He turned to him (mercifully). Surely He is oft-returning (to mercy), the Merciful. We said: Go forth (ihbitu) from this state all. Surely there will come to you a guidance from Me, then whoever follows My guidance, no fear shall come upon them nor shall they grieve” (2:37, 38). Elsewhere also: “Then his Lord chose him, so He turned to him (mercifully) and guided (him). He said, Go forth herefrom both — all (of you) — one of you (is) enemy to another. So there will surely come to you guidance from Me; then whoever follows My guidance, he shall not go astray, nor be unhappy” (20:122, 123). Thus Adam’s reply to Moses was that it was not due to his fault that men had to live in a state of struggle with the devil, for such was the Divine scheme even before he was born.

The details of the rest of the hadith of Bukhari need not be gone into. Many of them are wrongly interpreted. For example, one report mentions the death of a grandson of the Holy Prophet, and of the Holy Prophet comforting the child’s mother with the words: “Allah’s is what He takes away and Allah’s is what He gives; everyone has a term of life, so let her be patient (Bu. 82:3). This report makes no mention at all of any decree of good and evil deeds. It speaks of a term of life, for every person has a term of life in God’s knowledge. Many other hadith of a similar nature are wrongly supposed to lend support to the doctrine of predestination. In one, the Holy Prophet is reported to have remarked in a certain company that there was not a man but his place in fire or in Paradise was written down. Thereupon a man said: “Shall we not rely then (and give up the doing of deeds), O Messenger of Allah?” The Holy Prophet said: “No: do work, for to everyone it is made easy”(Bu. 82:3); and then he recited the following verse: “Then as for him who gives (charity) and keeps his duty and accepts what is good — We facilitate for him (the way to) ease. And as for him who is niggardly and considers himself self-sufficient and rejects what is good — We facilitate for him (the way to) distress” (92:5-10). If any conclusion of predestination could be drawn from the words of the hadith, the verses quoted by the Holy Prophet, in support of what he said, negative such a conclusion, for they speak of two different ends for two different kinds of workers. The words of the Holy Prophet himself lead to the same conclusion, for he laid stress on works. Nor do his concluding words “to everyone it is made easy” lead to any other conclusion, for the meaning is that to the worker of good, the good end, and to the worker of evil, the evil end, is made easy, as stated in the Qur’anic verses quoted in support of his assertion.

The real issue may now be dealt with. It has been shown, firstly, that though the Holy Qur’an speaks of qadar or taqdir, these words by no means carry the significance of predestination or of a decree of good and evil for man; secondly, that the qadar or taqdir of which the Holy Book speaks is of a general nature, a law prevailing in the whole of the universe, a limitation under which the whole of creation is moving onward, and that therefore qadar or taqdir has nothing to do with the good and evil deeds which are special to man; thirdly, that there is, in the Holy Qur’an or in the most reliable hadith, no mention at all of the necessity of faith (iman) in qadar or taqdir; and fourthly, that it is never mentioned as one of the fundamentals of religion like faith in God and His angels and His books and His apostles and a life after death. Qadar or taqdir is spoken of simply as a Divine law prevailing in the universe, like many other laws, and no question concerning faith in them arises. It must also be clearly understood that the fundamentals of religion are all fully explained in the Holy Qur’an itself; and a thing cannot be accepted as a fundamental of Islam of which there is no mention in the Holy Book. Hadith is only a secondary source of the religion of Islam and, as a matter of fact, it deals only with secondary matters of religion or its details. The great principles, the basic doctrines, must all be sought from the Holy Qur’an, which neither mentions qadar among the fundamentals of Islam, nor even speaks of a faith in it. It is only in Hadith that we find mention of qadar, and even here the most reliable of all collections, the Bukhari, does not contain any report mentioning faith in qadar as an article of Islam. Thus to both the Holy Qur’an and the Bukhari, faith in qadar is unknown, and therefore to speak of it as a fundamental of Islam is a mistake.

There is indeed one hadith which shows that faith in qadar is of later growth. In his second book, the book of Faith, Bukhari relates the following report from Abu Hurairah: “The Holy Prophet was one day sitting outside among a number of people when there came to him a man and said, What is faith? The Holy Prophet replied, Faith is this that thou believe in Allah and His angels and the meeting with Him, and His messengers, and that thou believe in life after death” (Bu. 2:37). The report is a lengthy one and only the first portion relating to the subject of discussion has been quoted. This same report is also related in Muslim through three different channels. In the first channel, the four narrators are the same as in Bukhari, and the words are also almost the same: “The Holy Prophet was one day sitting outside among a number of people when there came to him a man and said, What is faith, O Messenger of Allah? The Holy Prophet replied, That thou believe in Allah and His angels and His Book and the meeting with Him, and His messengers, and that thou believe in the life after death (M. 1:1). In his second channel, the first three narrators are again the same as in Bukhari and the report is narrated in the words quoted above. In his third channel, only the first two narrators are the same, the rest being different, and a change is introduced into the words, the portion relating to the Holy Prophet’s reply now assuming the following form: “That thou believe in Allah and His angels and His Book and the meeting with Him, and His messengers, and that thou believe in the life after death and that thou believe in qadar, in the whole of it” (M. 1:1). It will be noticed that when the narrators are the same as in Bukhari (with the exception of the last narrator from whom Muslim took his words), the words of the hadith are almost the same, there being only an addition of the words “and His Book.” These words have either been added by one of Muslim’s narrators, as the natural result of faith in messengers of God, or they have been left out by one of Bukhari’s narrators, as being included in faith in the Divine messengers. Otherwise, the fundamentals of faith are exactly the same and so even the words in both narrations. Even when Muslim has only Bukhari’s three top narrators, the words of the report are still the same. But in the third channel, where only two top narrators of Bukhari, Abu Hurairah and Abu Zar‘a, are retained, the words are changed, and quite a new element is introduced into it by the addition of faith in qadar, which the original does not contain. This shows beyond the shadow of a doubt that the words “faith in qadar” were added by the third narrator, and that these words were not spoken either by Abu Hurairah or even by the next narrator, Abu Zar‘a, and thus there remains not the least doubt that the inclusion of faith in qadar among the fundamentals of faith, is an addition of about the end of the first century of Hijrah. There is no doubt that discussion about qadar arose later, and it was during these discussions that, through inadvertence or otherwise, some narrator put these words into the mouth of Abu Hurairah.

The same hadith has again been narrated by Muslim through quite a different channel, with an introductory note from the last narrator, Yahya ibn Ya‘mar, as follows: “the first man who held the view of qadar in Basra was Ma‘bad al-Juhani, so I and Humaid ibn ‘Abd al-Rahman went out on a pilgrimage, and we said that if we meet any Companion of the Holy Prophet, we will question him about what these persons say regarding qadar, and it was granted to us to meet ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar entering the mosque” (M. 1:1). The note then goes on to say that the narrator asked ‘Abd Allah “about people who say there is no qadar and that the affair begins just now.” Then the same hadith is related in different words, and the part of it under discussion runs thus: “That thou believe in Allah and His angels and His Books and His messengers and the last day and that thou believe in the qadar, the good of it and the evil of it.” It will be noticed that the words “meeting with Him (liqai-hi)” are omitted in this report, while to the belief in the qadar of Abu Hurairah’s report are added the words the good of it and the evil of it (khairi-hi wa sharri-hi). The introductory note is too clear. Discussions were being carried on relating to qadar, and a party had arisen which entirely denied it. ‘Abd Allah ibn ‘Umar lived till the 73rd year of the Hijrah, and on being questioned about the matter, he is alleged not only to have upheld qadar but also to have related a hadith which mentioned belief in it, as one of the fundamentals of Islam. Bukhari has not accepted this hadith, while Muslim, granting the correctness of Bukhari’s hadith which does not make any mention of qadar, has shown that Ibn ‘Umar’s report cannot be relied upon, and probably the anxiety to silence opponents had led to indiscretion on the part of some controversialist.

It is difficult to say what meaning faith in qadar carried. The words occurring in one report are “that thou believe in qadar in the whole of it,” and in a second, “that thou believe in qadar, in the good of it and the evil of it.” A third version, “that thou believe in qadar, in the good of it and the evil of it, being from Allah,” which is ordinarily met with in the books on beliefs (‘aqa’id) cannot be traced to any hadith. It is very probable that the latter two additions were even later than the first formulation of belief in qadar. If we take the word qadar in the original sense in which it is used in the Holy Qur’an, a belief “in qadar, in the whole of it,” would only mean that one must believe that everything in this universe is subject to a law and under a limitation, God alone being the Controller of all. If we take the next form, “that thou believe in qadar, in the good of it and the evil of it,” “the good and the evil” does not refer to the good or evil deeds of man, but to the good or bad circumstances under which man is placed to work out his destiny. The original words khair and sharr have been freely used in the Holy Qur’an in this sense. Khair is anything which brings good, and its opposite is sharr (R.); and khair or sharr means doing good or doing evil only when a word meaning doing is added to it, the equivalent for which is ‘amal. The good of qadar and the evil of qadar, therefore, mean only whatever of good fortune or evil fortune comes to man. The meaning would therefore be that whatever of good or evil fortune comes to man, it must be accepted as coming from God; in other words a man must completely surrender himself to the Divine will under all circumstances. This, as already shown, is one of the great lessons of life which has been taught to the Muslim.

The first man who formulated the orthodox views which are accepted by the general body of Muslims was Imam Abu-l-Hasan Ash‘ari, after whom his followers are known as Asha‘riah, and he plainly states this to be the significance of a faith in qadar; for, speaking of the beliefs of Ahl Sunnah and the followers of Hadith, he says: “And that good (khair) and evil (sharr) are by the qadza of Allah and by His qadar, and they believe in the qadza of Allah and His qadar, in the good of it and the evil of it, the sweet of it and the bitter of it, and that they do not control for themselves any profit or any loss” (MI. p. 292). Evidently the words “sweet” and “bitter” (huluwei-hi wa murri-hi) and the words “profit” and “loss” are added to explain that by good and evil, khair and sharr, are meant good fortune and evil fortune, ease and hardship, not good and evil deeds done by man. This contentment under all conditions, is, as already shown, one of the great lessons of life taught to a Muslim, but it is neither a doctrine nor a principle of faith.

This much is certain that belief in qadar does not mean belief in predestination; for predestination, for which the Arabic word is jabr, has never been the belief of the Muslim community. The Jabariyah, or believers in predestination, have, on the other hand, been recognized as a heretical sect. A strict predestinarian, who believes that man has no control at all over his actions, would deny the very basic principle of religion, that is, the responsibility of man for his actions. The orthodox position has always been the middle one. Man has a free will, but that will is exercised under certain limitations. It is only the Divine will that can be called an absolutely free will, a will under no limitations; but everything created, and therefore everything human, is subject to qadar, to a Divine measure of things, to limitations imposed upon it by a Higher controlling Power. Man is the possessor neither of absolute knowledge, nor of absolute power, nor yet of absolute will. All these attributes belong properly to God. Human knowledge, human power and human will are all subject to limitations, and these limitations are placed upon man by the Divine measure which is called qadar. It is only in this sense that a Muslim can be said to have faith in qadar.