1.3 Ijtihad Or Exercise Of Judgement

Ijtihad is the third source from which the laws of Islam are drawn. The word itself is derived from the root jahd which means exerting oneself to the utmost or to the best of one’s ability, and Ijtihad, which literally conveys the same significance, is technically applicable to a lawyer’s exerting the faculties of mind to the utmost for the purpose of forming an opinion in a case of law respecting a doubtful and difficult point (LL.)

Reasoning or the exercise of judgement, in theological as well as in legal matters, plays a very important part in the religion of Islam, and the value of reason is expressly recognized in the Holy Qur’an, which is full of exhortations like the following: “Do you not reflect?” “Do you not understand?” “Have you no sense?” “There are signs in this for a people who reflect;” “There are signs in this for a people who understand;” and so on. Those who do not use their reasoning faculty are compared to animals, and spoken of as being deaf, dumb and blind:

“And the parable of those who disbelieve is as the parable of one who calls out to that which hears no more than a call and a cry. Deaf, dumb, blind, so they have no sense” (2:171).

“They have hearts wherewith they understand not, and they have eyes wherewith they see not, and they have ears wherewith they hear not. They are as cattle; nay, there are more astray” (7:179).

“The vilest of beasts in Allah’s sight are the deaf, the dumb, who understand not’’ (8:22). “Or thinkest thou that most of them hear or understand? They are but as the cattle; nay, they are farther astray from the path” (25:44).

While those who do not exercise their reason or judgement are condemned, those who do it are praised:

“In the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of the night and the day, there are surely signs for men of understanding. Those who remember Allah standing and sitting and (lying) on their sides, and reflect on the creation of the heavens and the earth” (3:190, 191).

The Holy Qur’an does recognize revelation as a source of knowledge higher than reason, but at the same time admits that the truth of the principles established by revelation may be judged by reason, and hence it is that it repeatedly appeals to reason and denounces those who do not use their reasoning faculty. It also recognizes the necessity of the exercise of judgement in order to arrive at a decision: “But if any news of security or fear comes to them, they spread it abroad. And if they had referred it to the Messenger and to those in authority among them, those of them who can search out the knowledge of it would have known it” (4:83).

The verse recognizes the principle of the exercise of judgement which is the same as Ijtihad, and though the occasion on which it is mentioned is a particular one, the principle recognized is general.

The exercise of judgement (ijtihad) is recognized in Hadith as the means by which a decision may be arrived at when there is no direction in the Holy Qur’an or Hadith. The following hadith is regarded as the basis of Ijtihad in Islam: “On being appointed Governor of Yaman, Mu‘adh was asked by the Holy Prophet as to the rule by which he would abide. He replied ‘By the law of the Holy Qur’an.’ ‘But if you do not find any direction therein’, asked the Holy Prophet. ‘Then I will act according to the practice (Sunnah) of the Holy Prophet,’ was the reply. ‘But if you do not find any direction therein,’ he was again asked. ‘Then I will exercise my judgement (ajtahidu) and act on that,’ came the reply. The Holy Prophet raised his hands and said: ‘Praise be to Allah Who guides the messenger of His Apostle as He pleases’ ’’ (AD. 23:11). This hadith shows not only that the Holy Prophet approved of the exercise of judgement, but also that his Companions were well aware of the principle, and that reasoning or exercise of judgement by others was freely resorted to when necessary, even in the Holy Prophet’s lifetime.

It is a mistake to suppose that the exercise of judgement to meet the new circumstances only came into vogue with the four great jurists (Imams) whose opinion is now generally accepted in the Islamic world. The work had begun, as already shown, in the Holy Prophet’s lifetime, since it was impossible to refer every case to him. After the Holy Prophet’s death, the principle of Ijtihad obtained a wider prevalence, and as new areas were added to the material and spiritual realm of Islam, the need of resorting to the exercise of judgement became greater. Nor did the Caliphs arrogate all authority to themselves. They had a council to which every important case was referred, and its decision by a majority of votes was accepted by the Caliph as well as by the Muslim public. Thus Suyuti writes in his History of the Caliphs on the authority of Abu al-Qasim Baghwi reporting from Maimun son of Mihran: “When a case came before Abu Bakr (the first Caliph), he used to consult the Book of God; if he found anything in it by which he could decide, he did so; if he did not find it in the Book, and he knew of a practice or saying of the Messenger of God, he decided according to it; and if he was unable to find anything there, he used to question the Muslims if they knew of any decision of the Holy Prophet in a matter of that kind, and a company of people thus gathered round him, every one of whom stated what he knew from the Holy Prophet, and Abu Bakr would say, ‘Praise be to God Who had kept among us those who remember what the Holy Prophet said’; but if he was unable to find anything in the practice of the Holy Prophet, he gathered the heads of the people, and the best of them, and consulted them, and if they agreed upon one opinion (by a majority) he decided accordingly.”

It is true that it was not exactly a legislative assembly in the modern sense, but the nucleus of a legislative assembly can clearly be seen in this council which decided all important affairs and, when necessary, promulgated laws. It was also supreme in both religious and temporal matters. The same rule was followed by ‘Umar, the second Caliph, who resorted to Ijtihad very freely, but took care always to gather the most learned Companions for consultation. When there was a difference of opinion, the decision of the majority was acted upon. Besides this council, there were great individual teachers, such as ‘A’ishah, Ibn ‘Abbas, Ibn ‘Umar and others, whose opinion was highly revered. Decisions were given and laws made and promulgated subject only to the one condition that they were neither contrary to the Holy Qur’an nor to the practice of the Holy Prophet.

In the second century of the Hijrah era arose the great jurists who codified the Islamic law according to the need of their time. The first of these, and the one who claims the allegiance of the greater part of the Muslim world, was Abu Hanifah Nu‘man ibn Thabit, born in Basrah in 80 A.H. (699 A.D.), a Persian by descent. His centre of activity, however, was Kufah, and he passed away in 150 A.H. (767 A.D.). The basis of his analogical reasoning (qiyas) was the Holy Qur’an, and he accepted Hadith only when he was fully satisfied as to its authenticity; and, as the collectors had not yet commenced the work of collection, and Kufah itself was not a great centre of that branch of learning, naturally Abu Hanifah accepted very few hadith, and always resorted to the Holy Qur’an for his juristic views. Later on when Hadith was collected, and was more in vogue, the followers of the Hanafi system — as Abu Hanifah’s school of thought was called — introduced into it more hadith. Abu Hanifah had two famous disciples, Muhammad and Abu Yusuf, and it is mostly their views of the great master’s teaching that now form the basis of the Hanafi system. Abu Hanifah was a man of highly independent character, and when, towards the close of his life, the then Muslim Government wanted to win him over to its side, he preferred imprisonment to an office which would have interfered with his independence of thought. His system is not only the first in point of time but is also that which claims allegiance from the great majority of Muslims, and a development of which on the right lines would have resulted in immense benefit to the Muslim world. It was he who first directed attention to the great value of analogical reasoning (qiyas) in legislation. He also laid down the principle of equity, whereby not only could new laws be made, but even logical conclusions could be controverted when proved inequitable. He recognized the authority of customs and usages, but exercised and inculcated independence of judgment to such an extent that he and his followers were called “upholders of private judgement” (ahl al-ra’y) by the followers of other schools.

The second famous jurist, Malik ibn Anas, was born in Madinah in 93 A.H. (713 A.D.); he worked and died there at the age of eighty-two. He limited himself almost entirely to the hadith which he found in Madinah, relating more especially to the practice which prevailed there, and his system of jurisprudence is based entirely on the Hadith and practices of the people of Madinah. He was scrupulously careful in giving judgement, and whenever he had the least doubt as to the correctness of his decision, he would say: “I do not know.” His book, Muwatta, though a comparatively small collection of Hadith, and limited only to the hadith and practices of the people of Madinah, is the first work of its kind, and one of the most authoritative.

The third jurist, Abu Abd Allah Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi‘i, was born in Palestine in the year 150 A.H. (767 A.D.). He passed his youth at Makkah, but he worked for the most part in Egypt, where he died in 204 A.H. In his day he was unrivalled for his knowledge of the Holy Qur’an, and took immense pains in studying the Hadith, travelling from place to place in search of information. He was intimately acquainted with the Hanafi and the Maliki schools of thought, but that which he himself founded was based largely on Hadith, as distinguished from the Hanafi system which was founded on the Holy Qur’an and made very little use of Hadith. Over the Maliki system, which is also based on Hadith, it had this advantage that the Hadith made use of by Shafi‘i was more extensive, and was collected from different centres, while Malik contented himself only with what he found at Madinah.

The last of the four great jurists was Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who was born in Baghdad in 164 A.H. and died there in 241. He too made a very extensive study of Hadith, his famous work on the subject — the Musnad of Ahmad ibn Hanbal — containing nearly thirty thousand hadith. This monumental compilation, prepared by his son ‘Abd Allah, was based on the material collected by the Imam himself. In the Musnad, however, as already remarked, hadith are not arranged according to subject-matter but according to names of the Companions to whom they are ultimately traced. Though the Musnad of Ahmad contains a large number of hadith, it does not apply those strict rules of criticism favoured by men like Bukhari and Muslim. It was indeed only an arrangement according to subject-matter that made a criticism of Hadith possible, and the Musnads, in which reports relating to the same matter were scattered throughout the book, could not devote much attention to the subject matter, and were not even sufficiently strict in scrutinizing the line of transmission. Accordingly, the Musnad of Ahmad cannot claim the same reliability as regards its material as can the collections of the other famous collectors. From the very nature of his exertions, it is evident that Ahmad ibn Hanbal made very little use of reasoning, and as he depended almost entirely on Hadith, the result was that he admitted even the weakest report. It would thus appear that from the system of Abu Hanifah, who applied reasoning very freely and sought to deduce all questions from the Holy Qur’an by the help of reason, the system of Ahmad ibn Hanbal is distinguished by the fact that it makes the least possible use of reason, and thus there was a marked falling off in the last of the four great jurists from the high ideals of the first, so far as the application of reason to matters of religion is concerned. Even the system of Abu Hanifah himself deteriorated on account of the later jurists of that school not developing the master’s high ideal, with the consequence that the world of Islam gradually gave up reasoning or exercise of judgement (Ijtihad) and stagnation reigned in the place of healthy development.

The four Jurists (Imams) who are accepted by the entire Sunni world of Islam, are thus agreed in giving an important place in legislation to Ijtihad, and the Shi‘as attached to it an even greater importance. In fact, the sphere of Ijtihad is a very wide one, since it seeks to fulfil all the requirements of the Muslim community which are not met with expressly in the Holy Qur’an and the Hadith. The great jurists of Islam have endeavoured to meet these demands by various methods, technically known as qiyas (analogical reasoning), istihsan (equity), istislah (public good), and istidlal (inference). Before proceeding further, a brief description of these methods may be given to show how new laws are evolved by adopting them.

The most important of these methods, and the one which has almost a universal sanction, is qiyas which may be described as ‘reasoning based on analogy’. A case comes up for decision, which is not expressly provided for either in the Holy Qur’an or in the Hadith. The jurist looks for a case resembling it in the Holy Qur’an or in Hadith, and, by reasoning on the basis of analogy, arrives at a decision. Thus it is an extension of the law as met with in the Holy Qur’an and Hadith, but it is not of equal authority with them, for no jurist has ever claimed infallibility for analogical deductions, or for decisions and laws which are based on qiyas; and it is a recognized principle of Ijtihad that the jurist may err in his judgement. Hence it is that so many differences of juristic deductions exist even among the highest authorities. From its very nature the qiyas of one generation may be rejected by a following generation.

Istihsan, in the terminology of the jurists, means the exercise of private judgement, not on the basis of analogy but on that of public good or the interest of justice. According to the Hanafi school, when a deduction based on analogy is not acceptable either because it is against the broader rules of justice or because it is not in the interest of the public good, and is likely to cause undue inconvenience to those to whom it is applied, the jurist is at liberty to reject the same, and to adopt instead a rule which is conducive to public good, or is in consonance with the broader rules of justice. This method is peculiar to the Hanafi system, but owing to strong opposition from the other schools of thought, it has not, even in that system, been developed to its full extent. The principle underlying it is, however, a very sound one and is quite in accordance with the spirit of the Holy Qur’an. There is, moreover, less liability to error in this method than in far-fetched analogy, which often leads to narrow results opposed to the broad spirit of the Holy Book. In the school of Imam Malik, a similar rule is adopted under the name of istislah which means “a deduction of law based on considerations of public good”.

Istidlal literally signifies the inferring of one thing from another, and the two chief sources recognized for such inferences are customs and usages, and the laws of religions revealed before Islam. It is admitted that customs and usages which prevailed in Arabia at the advent of Islam, and which were not abrogated by Islam, have the force of law. On the same principle, customs and usages prevailing anywhere, when not opposed to the spirit of the teachings of the Holy Qur’an or not forbidden by it, would be admissible, because, according to a well-known maxim of the jurists, “permissibility is the original principle,” and therefore what has not been declared unlawful is permissible. In fact, as a custom is recognized by a vast majority of the people, it is looked upon as having the force of Ijma‘, and, hence, it has precedence over a rule of law derived from analogy. The only condition required is that it must not be opposed to a clear text of the Holy Qur’an or a reliable hadith of the Holy Prophet. The Hanafi law lays special stress on the value of customs and usages. As regards laws revealed previous to Islam, opinion is divided. Some jurists hold that all such laws as have not been expressly abrogated have the force of law even now, while others argue that they have not. According to the Hanafi school, those laws of the previous religions are binding which have been mentioned in the Holy Qur’an without being abrogated.

In the terminology of the Muslim jurists, Ijma‘means a consensus of opinion of the Muslim jurists of a particular age on a question of law. This agreement is inferred in three ways: firstly, by word (qaul), i.e., by recognized jurists expressing an opinion on the point in question; secondly, by deed (fi‘l), i.e., when there is unanimity in practice; and thirdly, by silence (sukut) — when the recognized jurists do not controvert an opinion expressed by one or more of them. It is generally held that Ijma‘ means the consensus of opinion of such authorities only (mujtahids), and those who are not learned in law do not participate in it, but some are of opinion that it means the agreement of all Muslims. There is a difference of opinion as to whether Ijma‘ is confined to a particular place or to one or more particular generations. Imam Malik based his Ijtihad on the consensus of opinion of the people of Madinah. Theoretically, such a limitation is untenable, as learned men were not confined to Madinah, and were sent out to outlying parts of the country even in the Holy Prophet’s lifetime. The more generally received opinion is that men of all places must be included. Again, the Sunni schools of thought exclude the Shi‘a jurists (mujtahids) from the purview of Ijma‘, and vice versa. The Shi‘as further hold that only descendants of ‘Ali and the Holy Prophet’s daughter Fatimah are the proper persons to exercise Ijtihad. Among the Sunnis, some jurists are of opinion that Ijma‘ is restricted only to the Companions of the Holy Prophet, others extending it to the next generation, but the general opinion is that it is not confined to any one generation, nor to any one country, and therefore only the consensus of opinion of all the Jurists of all countries in any one age is an effective Ijma‘, and this is almost an impossibility.

There is considerable difference of opinion as to whether an effective Ijma‘ is formed by a majority of the jurists or by the agreement of the entire body of them. Most authorities require the unanimity of opinion of all the jurists of a particular age, but others have held the opposite view. However, it is generally agreed that if there is an overwhelming preponderance of jurists holding a certain view, that view is valid and binding, though not absolute. Ijma‘ is said to be complete when all the jurists of a particular age have come to an agreement on a certain question, though according to some it is necessary that all of them should have passed away without changing their opinion on that question. Some go still further and assert that no Ijma‘ is effective unless it is shown that no jurist born in that age has expressed a contrary opinion.

When Ijma‘ is established on a point, its effect is that no single jurist is permitted to reopen it, unless some jurist of the age in which the Ijma‘ came about had expressed a different view. One Ijma‘ may, however, be repealed by another in the same age or in a subsequent age, with this reservation that the Ijma‘ of the Companions of the Holy Prophet cannot be reversed by any later generation. Views differ as to whether or not, when there is disagreement on a question among the Companions, an Ijma‘ upholding one view or the other is debarred. The fact that even a Companion may have made an error in forming a judgement is admitted on all hands, and therefore technically, there can be no objection to an Ijma‘ which goes against the opinion of a Companion.

Two more points have to be elucidated in order to realize the full force of Ijma‘. From what has been stated above, it would seem that a very large number of jurists would be needed for a valid Ijma‘. It is, however, held that if three or even two of them take part in deliberating on a question, the Ijma‘ is valid, while one jurist is of opinion that, if in any particular age there is only one jurist his solitary opinion would have the authority of Ijma‘. And now we come to the most important question: What is the authority on which Ijma‘ is to be based? According to the four great Imams, it may be based on the Holy Qur’an or on Hadith or on analogy. The Mu‘tazilas, however, hold that it cannot be based on isolated hadith or on analogy. They, and some others, hold that as Ijma‘ is absolute, the authority on which it is based must also be absolute.

It would thus be seen that it is a mistake to call Ijma‘ an independent source of the laws of Islam. It is essentially reasoning or exercise of judgement (Ijtihad), with this distinction that it is Ijtihad on which all or the majority of the jurists of a certain generation are agreed. It is even admitted that, barring the Ijma‘ of the Companions, the Ijma‘ of one generation of Muslims may be set aside by that of another. The fact, however, is that if Ijma‘ is taken to mean the consensus of opinion of all the jurists of a certain generation of Muslims, it has never been practicable after perhaps the early days of the Companions. The Muslims having spread far and wide and living, as they did, in distant places, could not all be occupied with the discussion of a certain question at one and the same time. Even in one country the same question need not occupy the attention of all the jurists simultaneously. There is, however, no denying the fact, that if many of them are agreed on a certain question, their opinion would carry greater weight than that of a single one, but even the opinion of many, or of all, is not infallible. Ijma‘, after all, is only Ijtihad on a wider basis, and like the latter it is always open to correction.

It may be added here that the sense in which the word Ijma‘ is commonly used nowadays is quite erroneous, for it is taken to mean the opinion of the majority, and it is generally thought that it is a sin on the part of a Muslim to differ with the views of the majority. But honest difference of opinion, instead of being a sin, is called a mercy by the Holy Prophet who is reported to have said: “The differences of my people are a mercy.” Difference of opinion is called a mercy because it is only through encouraging it that the reasoning faculty is developed, and the truth ultimately discovered. There were many differences of opinion among the Companions, and there were also matters on which a single man used to express boldly his dissent from all the rest. For example, Abu Dharr was alone in holding that to have wealth in one’s possession was a sin. His opinion was that no one should amass wealth, and that as soon as one came into possession of it, one must distribute it to the poor. All the other Companions were opposed to this view, yet the authority of the majority was never quoted against him, nor did anyone dare say that he deserved to be punished for this difference of opinion with the whole body of Companions. Ijtihad, on the other hand, is encouraged by a saying of the Holy Prophet, which promises reward even to the man who makes an error in it: “When the judge gives a judgement and he exercises his reasoning faculty and is right, he has a double reward, and when he gives a judgement and exercises his reasoning faculty and makes a mistake, there is a reward for him.

Later jurists speak of three degrees of Ijtihad, though there is no authority for this in either the Holy Qur’an or the Hadith or in the writings of the great Imams. These three are: exercise of judgement in legislation (ijtihad filshar‘) in a juristic system, (Ijtihad fil-madhhab), and in particular cases (Ijtihad fil-masa’il). The first kind of Ijtihad (exercise of judgement) in the making of new laws, is supposed to have been limited to the first three centuries and, practically, it centres in the four Imams who, it is thought, codified all law and included in their systems whatever was reported from the Companions and the generation next to them (Tabi‘in). Of course, it is not laid down in so many clear words that the door of Ijtihad for making laws is closed after the second century of Hijrah, but it is said that the condition necessary for a jurist of the first degree have not been met with in any person after the first four Imams, and it is further supposed that they will not be met with in any person till the Day of Judgement. These conditions are three: a comprehensive knowledge of the Holy Qur’an in its different aspects, a knowledge of the Hadith with its lines of transmission, text and varieties of significance, and a knowledge of the different aspects of qiyas (reasoning). No reason is given why these conditions were met with only in four men in the second century of Hijrah, and why they were not met with in any person among the Companions or in the first century. It is an assertion without a basis. The second degree of Ijtihad — exercise of judgement in a juristic system — is said to have been granted to the immediate disciples of the first four Imams. Muhammad and Abu Yusuf, the two famous disciples of Abu Hanifah, belong to this class, and their unanimous opinion on any point must be accepted, even if it goes against that of their master. The third degree of Ijtihad — pertaining to particular cases — was attainable by later jurists who could solve special cases that came before them which had not been decided by the jurists of the first two degrees, but such decisions must be in absolute accordance with the opinion of the latter. The door of such Ijtihad is also supposed to have been closed after the sixth century of Hijrah. And at present, it is said, there can be only muqallidin, literally “those who follow another in what he says or does, firmly believing him to be right therein, regardless of proof or evidence.” They may only quote a decision (fatwa) from any of the earlier authorities, or when there are differing opinions of the earlier jurisconsults they can choose one of them, but they cannot question the correctness of what has been said. Thus Ijtihad which was never considered to be an absolute authority by the great Imams or their immediate disciples is now practically placed on the same level with the Holy Qur’an and the Hadith and hence no one now is considered to be fit for Ijtihad.

But it is a mistake to suppose that the door of Ijtihad was closed after the four Imams mentioned above. It is quite clear that the free exercise of judgement was allowed by the Holy Qur’an, while both the Holy Qur’an and the Hadith explicitly allowed analogical deduction (istinbat), and it was on the basis of these directions that the Muslim world continued to exercise its judgement in making laws for itself. The Companions made use of it even in the Holy Prophet’s lifetime, when it was not convenient to refer a matter to him personally; and after his death, as new circumstances arose, new laws were made by a majority of the Caliph’s council and new decisions given by the learned among the Companions; the next generation (Tabi‘un.) added upto the knowledge of the Companions; and each succeeding generation, not satisfied with what the previous one had achieved, freely applied its judgement.

The second century saw the four great luminaries appear on the horizon of Ijtihad, and the appearance of these great jurists one after another, each evidently dissatisfied with what his predecessor had achieved, is another conclusive argument that Islam permitted human judgement to be exercised freely to meet new circumstances. Malik was not content with what his great predecessor Abu Hanifah had accomplished, nor Shafi‘i with what his two predecessors had done; and in spite of the three having practically exhausted the well of jurisprudence, Ahmad ibn Hanbal gave to a world, whose thirst for knowledge was ever on the increase, the result of the application of his own judgement. The great jurists not only applied their judgement to new circumstances but they also differed in their principle of jurisprudence, which shows that no one of them considered the others infallible. If they were not infalliable then, how did they become such after so many centuries when the mere lapse of time necessitated new legislation to meet new requirements? That the Holy Prophet opened the door of Ijtihad is only too clear, that he never ordered it to be closed after a certain time is admitted on all hands; and even the great Imams never closed that door. Neither Abu Hanifah, nor Malik, nor Shafi‘i, nor yet Ahmad ibn Hanbal ever said that no one after him shall be permitted to exercise his own judgement, nor did any one of them claim to be infallible; neither does any book on the principles of jurisprudence (usul) lay down that the exercise of a man’s own judgement for the making of new laws was forbidden to the Muslims after the four Imams, nor yet that their Ijtihad has the same absolute authority as the Holy Qur’an and the Hadith.

Ijtihad was a great blessing to the Muslim people; it was the only way through which the needs of succeeding generations and the requirements of different races merging into Islam could be met. Neither the Holy Prophet, nor any of his Companions, nor any of the great jurists ever said that Muslims were forbidden to apply their own judgement to new circumstances and the ever changing needs of a growing community after a certain time; nor has any one of them said, what in fact no one could say, that no new circumstances would arise after the second century. What happened was that the attention of the great intellects of the third century was directed towards the collection and criticism of the Hadith. On the other hand, the four Imams rose so high above the ordinary jurists that the latter were dwarfed into insignificance, and the impression gained ground gradually that no one could exercise his judgement independently of the former. This impression in its turn led to limitations upon Ijtihad and the independence of thought to which Islam had given an impetus. Being thus restrained by a false impression, the intellect of Islam suffered a heavy loss and the increasing demand of knowledge being brought to a standstill, stagnation and ignorance took its place.

The Holy Qur’an recognizes independence of opinion for one and all, and requires that absolute obedience be given only to God and His Messenger: “O you who believe, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority from among you; then if you quarrel about anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger” (4:59). This verse speaks first of obedience to those in authority (ulu-l-amr), along with the obedience to the Messenger, and then mentions disputes which, it says, must be settled by referring them to God and His Messenger. The omission of ulu-l-amr from the latter portion of the verse shows clearly that the quarrel here spoken of relates to differences with ulu-l-amr, and in the case of such a difference the only authority is that of God and the Messenger, or the Holy Qur’an and the Hadith. Every authority in Islam, whether temporal or spiritual, is included in ulu-l-amr, and independence of thought for every Muslim is thus recognized by allowing him to differ with all except the Holy Qur’an and the Hadith. The Companions, the Collectors of Hadith, the four Imams and the other jurists being thus included in ulu-l-amr, must be obeyed ordinarily, but to differ with any one or all of them, when one has the authority of the Holy Qur’an and the Hadith is expressly permitted. And since the ultimate test of the correctness of Hadith is the Holy Qur’an itself, the conclusion is evident that Islam allows independence of thought subject only to one thing, that the principles laid down in the Holy Qur’an are not contravened.

It will thus be seen that any Muslim community has the right to make any law for itself, the only condition being that such law shall not contravene any principle laid down by the Holy Qur’an. The impression prevailing in the Muslim world at present that no one has the right, even in the light of the new circumstances which a thousand years of the world’s progress have brought about, to differ with the four Imams, is entirely a mistaken one. The right to differ with the highest of men below the Holy Prophet is a Muslim’s birthright, and to take away that right is to stifle the very existence of Islam. Under the present circumstances, when conditions have quite changed and the world has been moving on for a thousand years, while the Muslims have more or less stagnated, it is the duty of Muslim states and Muslim peoples to apply their own judgement to the changed conditions, and find out the ways and means for their temporal salvation. In fact, the closing of the door on the free exercise of judgement, and the tendency to stifle independence of thought which took hold of the Muslim world after the third century of Hijrah, was condemned by the Holy Prophet himself who said: “The best of the generations is my generation, then the second and then the third; then will come a people in which there is no good.” And again he said: “The best of this community (ummah) are the first of them and the last of them; among the first of them is the Messenger of Allah, and among the last of them is Jesus, son of Mary, and between these is a crooked way, they are not of me nor am I of them.”

The three generations in the first hadith refer to three centuries, the first century being the century of the Companions, since the last of them died at the end of the first century after the Holy Prophet and the second and third being those of the next two generations known as Tabi‘in and taba‘ Tabi‘in. As a matter of fact, we find that while independence of thought was freely exercised in the first three centuries, and even Muhammad and Abu Yusuf, the immediate followers of Abu Hanifah, did not hesitate to differ with their great leader, rigidity became the rule thereafter with only rare exceptions. The time when independence of thought was not exercised is, therefore, denounced by the Holy Prophet himself, as the time of a crooked company.